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The Employment Contract
Ian Ayres and Stewart Schwab
Editor s Note: This article consists of
Professors Ian Ayres and Stewart Schwab spre-
sentation given at the Economic Analysis of
State Employment Law Issues Symposium.
Following the presentation, audience members
and the presenters participated in a discussion
concerning employment contracts. The Journal
staff and Professors Ayres and Schwab com-
piled and edited some of these questions and
responses.
I. Employee Benefits in a Well-
Functioning Market
Professor Schwab
The topic for this afternoon is the employ-
ment contract. As Henry suggested, I'd like to
start with a standard law-and-economics analy-
sis and ask: what benefits or protections to
workers will a well-functioning market pro-
vide? I'll save for a little while a precise defi-
nition of"well-functioning," but the basic point
is that in a well functioning employment mar-
ket, employers will provide all benefits and
protections that employees are willing to pay
for. (I'll now assume that benefits and protec-
tions are mostly the sante thing, and thus state
more simply that well-functioning markets will
provide all benefits that employees are willing
to pay for.) It's sometimes phrased "willing
and able to pay for," which is an accurate qual-
ification. If a worker does not have the money
to offer two dollars for some benefit, then that
benefit is a luxury the worker prefers not to
have. In a well-functioning market, employers
will not provide benefits and protections that
employees are unwilling to pay for.
We could debate in the abstract what this
means, but I'd instead like to start off with an
example. The example will be central, which is
the at-will contract versus the just-cause con-
tract, versus some possible variations or mid-
points between the two. So, let's take just-
cause as an example of a benefit that could
potentially be provided to workers.
To stylize the situation, let's say that just-
cause compared to at-will costs employers 50
to provide. If you are unwilling to accept the
notion that just-cause is more expensive to
employers, the skepticism against the just-
cause contract vanishes. So we start at 50 (let's
not worry about the units). Now, two employ-
ers exist. First is Schwab Corporation, the
rough and ready type of corporation. We go
with an at-will contract at my place and pay
wages equal to W. The other employer is Ayres
Corporation, the caring corporation. It offers a
just-cause contract, but a wage of W minus 50.
This wage is lower by exactly the cost of pro-
viding the just-cause benefit.
Let's pause just a moment and interrogate
the CEO of this corporation. Why did you
lower the wage by 50 if you're so caring and
nice? Why not just lower it by ten?
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ProCessor Ayres
I'm not that caring. With a competitive
market, I can't make a profit ifI offer my work-
ers benefits that cost me 50 and pay wages that
are only ten less than my competitor's wages.
ProCessor Schwab
You can't sell something that costs you 50
for ten and stay in business too long. Okay, it's
got to be at least 50. Well, why not reduce their
wage by 100? Have you thought about that?
ProCessor Ayres
I have thought about it.
ProCessor Schwab
With the subtitle of his corporation's slo-
gan being "the caring, but also caring to our
shareholders" corporation.
ProCessor Ayres
I would be terribly worried that my com-
petitors would take workers from me.
ProCessor Schwab
The concern is that with competition
among employers, Ayres Corporation will
shoot itself in the foot if it tries to price this
benefit too much to its shareholders' advantage.
Other employers, such as the Butler
Corporation, knowing the lay of the land, will
say, "Well, if Ayres is going to deduct 100 from
wages when providing this benefit to its work-
ers, I'll only deduct 80 and attract all the good
workers." Other competitors will come in and
say, "We can make money by deducting just 70,
... just 60, ... and so on." So the argument is,
in a competitive market these benefits, like any-
thing else, will be sold at cost. "Cost," of
course, is an economic term of art. It includes
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a normal return on profit. Ayres Corporation
will make money when it sells this benefit at
50, but it will make just a normal or ordinary
profit.
So now we have two corporations:
Schwab Corporation offering a wage of Wand
at-will contracts, and Ayres Corporation offer-
ing a wage of W-50 and just-cause protection.
The question that arises is, where are the work-
ers going to go? Are they going to choose the
Schwab firm? "Workers, watch out," is the slo-
gan at Schwab. Or will workers chooses Ayres
"the caring" Corporation, which is willing to
back up its promise to terminate workers fairly
by allowing judges to entertain breach-of-con-
tract suits. If a worker has a problem with the
way he or she was dismissed by Ayres, go run
to the judge. Well, where would the workers
go?
The answer can't be determined until I
give you one more piece ofdata. How much do
workers value this benefit? We can determine
this by seeing which workers choose Schwab
and which choose Ayres. Ayres Corporation
gets those workers who value just-cause at
more than fifty. Schwab Corporation gets the
rest. This is a stylized example, but it illustrates
the economic argument. We're in a competitive
labor market. Ayres and Schwab have two dif-
ferent business strategies; Ayres will attract cer-
tain workers, or maybe all the workers, and
Schwab will attract other workers, possibly all
of them.
II. Legal Intervention in Labor Markets
ProCessor Schwab
Walter Olson keeps emphasizing that most
(maybe all) employers offer at-will. What are
we to conclude from this, based on the stylized
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example? We can conclude one of two things.
First, we can conclude that workers are unwill-
ing to buy just-cause at its cost. This does not
mean that workers don't at all value the benefit.
Of course they want it. We all want lots of
things but are either unwilling or unable to pay
for most of them. We conclude that workers
would rather have an additional 50 in wages,
apparently, than the just-cause benefits. In
other words, they prefer the higher wages from
Schwab Corporation to the job protection of
Ayres Corporation. Workers don't value it as
much as it costs. And that's why the benefit is
not provided. The other conclusion is that
something is wrong with the market. And, I
think from the economist's perspective, that
exhausts the possibilities.
Following this analysis, if the law is to
intervene in the market for just-cause benefits,
it can be justified only on one of two grounds.
The first justification is paternalistic: it's true
the workers didn't value just-cause protection,
but they didn't know what they were doing.
Workers don't what is in their best interests. If
that's true, the fact that they aren't choosing
firms that would offer this benefit is of no con-
sequence. We know better. Of course, who
"we" is becomes the troublesome point in
paternalism arguments. It is not impossible to
make paternalistic arguments, and I think that a
lot ofemployment regulation is based at least in
part on a paternal rationale. Indeed, paternalis-
tic arguments have seen a resurgence in recent
years. Cass Sunstein has explored the idea of
anti-anti-paternalism arguments, pointing to
psychological blocks that workers might have
that counter the concern that regulation against
what workers want is paternalistic. I
The other justification for regulation is that
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the labor market has failed, so we should cor-
rect the market failure. That's why we are
intervening in these markets and mandating
that benefits be provided. I will list just a few
possible market failures. First, because work-
ers have no bargaining power in an unregulated
market, we should therefore intervene and man-
date benefits. This is the rationale typically
used to justify employment regulation.
Undoubtedly you have encountered this argu-
ment in your own caselbads. Imperfect, espe-
cially asymmetric, information can cause mar-
ket failure. If workers don't know what Ayres
Corporation and Schwab Corporation are offer-
ing, one cannot confidently assume that the
market will offer all benefits that workers are
willing to pay for.
Professor Ayres
If I can jump in, not only is worker igno-
rance about conditions a problem, but employ-
er ignorance about the qualities of the employ-
ees can lead to certain types of market failure.
Perhaps all employees currently say they want
employment at-will as a way of signaling to
employers that they are good employees. But
this is because the workers cannot prove they
are good workers in other ways. Willingness to
accept at-will contracts is a way of signaling
when employers are ignorant about the employ-
ees good qualities. There are a lot of signaling
models that sometimes lead to disastrous
effects. If everybody tries to show that they are
better than other people, we can have ineffi-
ciently large amounts of signaling. For exam-
ple, in debt contracts, ifyou want to really show
that you are going to pay back a debt then you
promise to give a pound of flesh along with it.
Even though libertarians might allow such con-
tracts, forbidding them can stop wasteful arms
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A somewhat different but related market
failure is asymmetrical performance. When
locked into a long-term career relationship, a
worker may have done all the hard work and
the employer hasn't paid up fully. This can lead
to problems. Another market failure comes
from externalities touched on by the panel
today: third-party effects not captured in the
employment contract. I want to come back to
this, and particularly, its relationship to the tort
of wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy.
Another source of market failure that I am
not planning to talk much about concerns col-
lective goods. Unregulated markets are not
good at getting the right quantity of a good
that's going to apply the same way for everyone
in the workplace. This is particularly so when
locked-in, inframarginal workers differ from
younger, marginal workers. Employers in com-
petitive markets tend to cater to younger people
who are just deciding whether to accept this job
or another. If these workers on the margin (or
fence) value benefits differently than older,
locked-in workers, the employer may not offer
the optimal amount of the benefit. Assessing
those arguments can lead to a technical discus-
sion (they are alluded to in some of the note
materials that I gave you). I think we've got
enough to discuss without going into those
types of market failure in detail.
I want to highlight this, and Henry would
have killed me if I hadn't put this one in. Just
because a market failure has been identified, all
that suggests is that intervention might help.
But it is also quite possible that the cure could
be worse than the disease. Calling for inter-
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vention simply because a market failure has
been identified is known as the "nirvana falla-
cy." A policymaker spots a failure in a real
world market, and then assumes that govern-
ment intervention-be it through the common
law or administrative agencies or anything else-
will correct it. Walter Olsen quite correctly
emphasizes that there are a lot of unintended
consequences from some ofthese well intended
interventions. Pointing to a market failure does
not yet justify intervention.
I think we lawyers are well familiar with
burden of persuasion and burden of proof argu-
ments. The nirvana fallacy argument attempts
to tweak the burden of persuasion. Going back
to the opening part of the lecture, the economic
approach asserts that, prima facie, markets will
provide all benefits that workers are willing to
pay for. Suppose it is shown that a certain ben-
efit is not provided. Just-cause is a good exam-
ple. The economic approach concludes that
workers would prefer higher wages to the ben-
efit. Policymakers who insist on just-cause
protection are being paternalistic. Given the
bad light of paternalism these days, the burden
shifts to those advocating intervention. How do
they meet that burden? First, by pointing to
some market failure. But the "nirvana fallacy"
argument requires interventionists to overcome
a second burden: They must also show that the
cure is not worse than the disease.
III. Unequal Bargaining Power as a
Rationale for Intervention
Professor Schwab
Let's discuss the unequal bargaining power
issue. For non-economists, this is the basic
argument for legal intervention in employment
markets. Economists are dubious of this argu-
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ment. They don't believe that the concept is
meaningless; in fact, I think we can give bar-
gaining power a meaning. Bargaining power
explains which side will get the lion's share of
gains from trade, including the gains from pro-
viding a particular benefit that workers are will-
ing to pay for. However, unequal bargaining
power does not explain why a particular benefit
will not be provided at all. In other words, the
following argument shows a lack of under-
standing of labor markets: "Here is a benefit
that workers want, are willing to pay for, but it's
not being provided. Why not? Because of
unequal bargaining power. Companies are big
and employees are little." Unequal bargaining
power is not a problem that will cause markets
not to provide all benefits that workers are will-
ing to pay for, nor is unequal bargaining power
a type of market failure.
Professor Ayres
I want to add the broader analogy to anti-
trust law. In anti-trust, the same fallacy holds
that monopolists would tend to produce shoddy
merchandise when in fact, it would actually be
more profitable for them to provide the efficient
level of quality. One of the first big insights of
law and economics is that profit-maximizing
monopolists want to produce their product effi-
ciently, but they don't want to price it efficient-
ly. If they produce a product that the market
wants the most, they'll be able to extract the
biggest amount of profit. The failure to recog-
nize this is a flaw in dozens of law review arti-
cles that complain about monopoly power.
Professor Schwab
I want to hammer this point home because
of its importance. The argument against the
usefulness of unequal bargaining power as a
Employment Contract
concept is controversial because unequal bar-
gaining power itself is vaguely stated. Often it
is a reflexive rationale for protecting the little
guy. What are some of the possible meanings
of "unequal bargaining power?" By the way,
the best writing on this point is by Duncan
Kennedy.2 Some ofyou may know the Harvard
Law School professor and a leader of the
Critical Legal Studies Movement. He is hardly
8 disciple or card-carrying member of law and
economics, but he is a sophisticated analyst of
the law. Let me summarize some of his writ-
ings on this point.
One possible meaning of une-qual bargain
power is, "Hey, I didn't have a chance to nego-
tiate on this." The worker cannot negotiate
whether there is going to be at-will or just-
cause in his or her contract. In the extreme
form, it does become an adhesion take-it-or-
leave-it contract. Not all such contracts, how-
ever, are adhesion contracts. The economist's
favorite example to show the lack of connec-
tion between take-it-or-leave-it contracts and
oppression is with Rice Krispies. Does
Kellogg's have bargaining power over con-
sumers? Have you ever tried to negotiate with
Kellogg's on the fraction of corn it puts in the
corn flakes, or the quality of its additives? You
wouldn't get too far. The point is that you don't
have to negotiate with Kellogg's, you can go
somewhere else, to another grocery store or
another brand of cereal. The fact that the sale
is take-it-or-leave-it neither shows bargaining
power nor shows that consumers are not getting
what they want or are willing to pay for. There
is an infmite variety of breakfast cereal, and
just because we aren't negotiating individually
over each transaction does not imply that we
aren't getting the exact breakfast cereal we are
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willing and able to pay for.
But take-it-or-leave-it is not the only possi-
ble meaning of unequal bargaining power.
Work is a necessity, which may distinguish
cornflakes. Food, of course, is a necessity.
Work is also a necessity, but somehow workers
cannot get benefits that they are willing to pay
for. And then, the related complaint that I have
already mentioned, is the relative size point.
The employer is large, the worker is small.
These conceptions of unequal bargaining
power do not hold up either.
Well then, let's continue with the stylized
example of earlier just to pin down the argu-
ment against unequal bargaining power. Let's
suppose Ayres Corporation has run me out of
business. Now, Ayres is a monopoly employer.
The technical term on the labor side is that he is
a monopsonist, because he is the only buyer of
labor in this town. A situation of many sellers
and one buyer is called monopsony, but the
basic principles are identical to monopoly.
As the only game in town, Ayres is only
paying his workers 200. Again, I'm trying to be
a little vague on the units here. Whatever 200
units is, it's low. As a monopsonist will do, it
pays lower wages than would be provided in a
competitive market. Look at Ayres with all that
bargaining power over there. It's unbelievable
how strong he is. But the question is, will he
offer just-cause to workers? Would you?
That's the question.
Professor Ayres
Naively, I'll say no.
Professor Schwab
Let's review his decision. Just-cause costs
monopsonist Ayres 50. That's what we said
earlier, and it still holds true. The additional
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people needed in the human resources depart-
ment and all the other difficulties with a just-
cause environment compared to an at-will envi-
ronment will cost Ayres 50. Suppose, however,
that the workers in this town value it at 60.
What this means is that they would prefer just-
cause and wages reduced by 60 to their current
wage and an at-will environment.
Recognizing the issue, will Ayres rethink?
Remember, you are a greedy, money grubbing,
profit maximizing, huge bargaining power
monopsonist.
Professor Ayres
Ok, I think I'd now cut my wage to 140
and offer just-cause.
Professor Schwab
Ah, what a clever monopsonist Ayres is!
He will drop the wage by the full cost of pro-
viding just-cause. In my handout, I suggested
dropping the wage by 59 to 141 so that workers
would benefit from the change in policy. But
let's not quibble over the last dollar. Ayres will
drop the wage by 59 or 60. The point being, if
he sees a profit opportunity from those exploit-
ed workers, he can exploit them all the more by
offering this benefit. This is just playing out the
point that Ian made earlier, that a monopolist
will try to provide the product that consumers
want the most, i.e., are willing and able to pay
the most for. And if workers are willing to pay
for just-cause, the monopsonist can make more
profits by providing it.
Suppose this monopsonist is lazy and does-
n't want to maximize profits. It was said, for
example, that Henry Ford paternalistically
wanted to help his workers rather than squeeze
maximum profits out of his car company. First,
this might not help the workers if they prefer
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money to job protection. But if a lazy monop-
sonist won't maximize profits by providing
benefits workers desire, the market for corpo-
rate control may change his mind. In other
words, a corporate raider, seeing the profit
potential from providing just-cause benefits,
may take over Ayres Corporation if Ayres for
some reason is too lazy to provide the benefit.
More simply stated, the only way a monopson-
ist will not provide the benefits workers are
willing to pay for is if the monopsonist does not
maximize profits. Thus, ironically, what start-
ed as an unequal bargaining power argument
became an argument against the profit-maxi-
mizing assumption.
Audience member question [hereinafter
"Question"]
Is a safe work place assumed here?
Professor Schwab
I would say that safety could be a benefit
just like job security. For our purposes, I'm
willing to cross out the term just-cause and
insert safe work place. One complication is
that there are degrees of safety, rather than safe
or unsafe. Ignoring this complication, I'd be
willing to say that if workers prefer working
with a slicing machine that has a hand guard on
it that costs employers an extra 50 a year, a
monopsonist employer will provide the hand
guard so long as workers are willing to accept a
wage deduction greater than 50. The monop-
sonist won't voluntarily offer the safety mea-
sure otherwise.
Professor Ayres
Just to reemphasize, the real point of this
exercise is to say that unequal bargaining power
by itself is not a good explanation for why
Employment Contract
employers will evilly deny just-cause protec-
tion. It could be true, and we will be getting to
this, that unequal bargaining power plus some
other stuff-particularly employee ignorance-
could lead toward inefficient contracting.
Maybe your question about safety suggests that
employees really won't know what level of
safety they have contracted for. If so, that is an
information problem rather than an unequal
bargaining power problem. For now, we are
arguing that ifworkers know the effects ofjust-
cause, or safety, unequal bargaining power isn't
going to be a pathology that leads to the wrong
kind ofquality.
This is an important point. It's not unequal
bargaining power. That's the argument that
economists think is just not a coherent or logi-
cal explanation for why the preferences of
workers won't be honored. It's not an example
of market failure. Other examples of market
failure may explain or justify intervention in
the name of safety. We have a session tomor-
row afternoon on both workers' compensation
and OSHA, which are premised on the idea that
something has gone wrong in the unregulated
safety market. But unequal bargaining power is
not the explanation for what went wrong.
Question
It's been a long time since I applied for a
job, and hopefully it'll be a lot longer. But, as
a practical matter, is this something that work-
ers bargain for, just-cause versus at-will? Are
they aware? At least in my recollection, I don't
ever recall asking an employer "Are you going
to have at-will or just-cause?"
Professor Schwab
Two separate issues are implied by your
question. One is that you never recalled bar-
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gaining over just-cause. The other is that you
don't recall even knowing whether the job was
at-will or just-cause. You are talking about face
to face negotiations, but we are not assuming
face to face negotiations in this standard model.
Rather, the idea is that workers shop around for
more or less friendly employers. For example,
until recently, IBM carefully nurtured a reputa-
tion for caring for its workers, including a poli-
cy of no layoffs. I think that's a good example.
Did anyone negotiate individually with IBM
for this clause? No. Did some people think it
important that they go with IBM rather than
another company? Yes. The choice of whic~
job to take depends on a number of factors, but
the model suggests that at the margin, this is
important. It's one of the factors you think
about.
Now, there is a related point suggested in
your question. When you were young and had
a lifetime ahead of you, did you worry about
job security? Less than you might value it now
that you are thirty-nine? That raises the very
significant problem of infra-marginal workers
valuing job security differently than marginal
workers. That can lead to market failure, but
that is not an unequal bargaining point.
Question
What is the reality of when the competitor
is driven out of town: is the monopsonist still
going to offer just-cause at a wage reduction of
50? It seems that the monopsonist is not going
to raise his price, but that he's going to drop
just-cause and still get the employees.
Professor Schwab
The question is, why did Ayres have a
price of 200 at the beginning? It should have
been 150. He was stupid in the beginning if as
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you suggest, he could get enough workers at
150 with an at-will relationship. He wasn't get-
ting the maximum profits out of his workforce.
Question
He offered one-half of the competition's
offer (i.e., 50, which was halfofyour offer), but
he used just-cause. You're gone. He's going to
stay at that price level and drop just-cause.
That's the reality.
Professor Schwab
Why do you think that's reality? In other
words, why do you think that it is profit-maxi-
mizing behavior to drop just-cause when work-
ers are valuing it at 60?
Question
I don't think he needs it. Work is a neces-
sity.
Professor Schwab
Why did Ayres pay more than 150 in the
first place?
Question
He could hire people at fifty percent of
what you paid. In my view, he's going to stay
at fifty percent because he has employees and
now he can get them without just-cause once
you leave town.
Professor Ayres
Your example makes sense, but this is a
slightly different point. Let's just say that I'm
a monopolist and there's nobody else that's
going to compete with me for wages, and let's
further assume we start in a world where I have
to give just-cause. I'm going to think about
what's the best wage I can pay before the work-
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ers say they won't work for me. Let's even pick
out a completely different number. Let's say
there's no other place in town where if they can
get just-cause they'll work for me for $100.
Now, Olsen wins the day and I have the chance
of waiving just-cause. What will happen if I
waive just-cause? Well, I think I'm going to
have to pay them more money. They were
willing to work for me at $100 when they had
just-cause protection. If I waive it, they value
that just-cause protection at $160. Now I'm
going to have to raise their wage to provide for
the difference between working for me at $100
with just-cause protection. Why will they work
for me for$IOO without just-cause protection?
Question
What if they have to?
Professor Ayres
Well, if they have to work for the employ-
er at 100 without just-cause protection, then the
employer paying 100 with just-cause protection
was too much. The employer could have got-
ten away with paying the workers only 90 or 80
with just-cause protection. The point is that in
the initial just-cause regime, a savvy employer
will keep wages lower until the employees are
indifferent between working and quitting. If
the employer then reduces benefits by switch-
ing to at-will and doesn't increase the wage,
then employees will quit.
Question
Well, there's going to be a level where peo-
ple won't work, or they will drive 100 miles to
another company.
Professor Ayres
That's precisely the point. I'm going to
Employment Contract
drive it, but the thing is, I'm basically not just a
monopolist in regard to hiring them. I'm also
the monopolist that can sell them this extra
price, just-cause. And, if I sell them that too, I
can make ten bucks off of it. That's a product
that costs me 50 and I can sell for 60 to them.
Why not be a monopolist in regard to these two
things instead of one?
IV. Evaluating Employment at Will
Professor Schwab
Richard Epstein has made a detailed argu-
ment in defense ofcontracting at-will.3 His key
insight is that dangers arise from being in a
long-term relationship. I think the analogy to
marriage is useful, though not perfect. A dan-
ger of opportunism by the other side exists
when you are locked into a relationship.
Epstein is good at pointing out is this: who can
be opportunistic? Opportunism can come from
either side of this employer/employee relation-
ship. The employer can be opportunistic by
paying low wages (at least lower wages than
the parties thought was appropriate when the
relationship began) or the employer can be
opportunistic by firing workers. A certain
inconsistency arises with this point. Why
would an employer want to fire workers whom
it is ripping off by paying low wages? The
employer won't want to fire under-paid work-
ers because it is making plenty on them.
The more controversial point by Epstein is
that the worker, as well as the employer, can be
opportunistic. The worker knows that the
employer is undertaking a lot of job-search
costs, training costs, etc. It's not easy to replace
that employee. The employee can underper-
form to certain degree without risk of being
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fIred. Economists use the controversial term
"shirking" for this behavior. As long as the cost
to the employer from the worker's shirking are
less than the costs of replacement, the employ-
er will not fIre the worker.
Epstein's basic argument is that at-will
reduces the problems of opportunism on both
sides. A party who feels exploited threatens to
end the relationship, and this threat becomes
credible when the other side is in fact being
opportunistic. Ifyou are being taken advantage
of, you can say to the other side, "You are treat-
ing me so badly that it's now becoming worth-
while for me to walk away. Ease up. Start per-
forming your side of the bargain a little better
or I will end this relationship." That's a more
credible threat when you can easily end a rela-
tionship, and at-will relationships are easy to
end.
Epstein's other point is that good workers
are in little danger of being fIred. Employers
generally are not in the business of fIring work-
ers that employers are making money on. Now,
clearly some mistakes (meaning the fIring of
productive workers) can happen. But then the
question arises: is this whole legal apparatus an
efficient way ofcorrecting those mistakes when
it is in the employer's interest to keep those
mistakes to a minimum? Employers generally
like to keep workers that they are creating prof-
its for the company.
This is Epstein's argument for at-will con-
tracts. What are the exceptions to the at-will
contract? Epstein recognizes some exceptions.
As Epstein notes, '~Contract at-will works only
where performance on both sides takes place in
lock-step progression."4 What does he mean?
He gives a couple of examples. The problems
arise when the parties contemplate asymmetri-
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cal performance. One side performs its side of
the bargain before the other side performs. You
then have problems, and at-will is not a good
tool for correcting such problems. A worker
who threatens to quit when he has done all the
work and not yet been paid is not posing a very
credible threat. "Go ahead and quit, make my
day," is the employer's likely response. When
the work is done and the employer refuses to
pay wages, at-will cannot correct that problem.
Compensation for job related personal injuries
is another category where Epstein says there is
asymmetrical performance, and at-will is not
good at handling this.
Problems with asymmetric performance
also arise over the career life-cycle of an
employee. In many career employments, a
worker implicitly agrees to work hard early in
the career in return for getting generous promo-
tions and benefIts later. That is an example of
asymmetrical performance because the
employer could receive its part of the bargain
(the hard work) before it must pay the generous
promotions and benefIts. The employer has an
incentive to end the relationship before it must
make these payments.
Professor Ayres
I think about law fIrms where you toil
away as an associate for years before getting
the big rewards.
Professor Schwab
Yes. When I give this talk to law students
who are about to jump in at the low end of an
eight-year pecking order with an implicit
promise of a fair chance at partnership, they
tune into this model. Large law fIrms often
work under this model. In fact, it's designed to
get associates to work hard in return for the
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possible rewards. The main reason that Epstein
would give as to why this does not create a big
problem is that the employers worry about their
reputation. How many times can you fire these
workers after they've done their hard work, but
before you've given them the rewards, and still
expect new workers to come in?
There are other problems with at-will con-
tracts that Epstein mentions. The most impor-
tant being that the contracting parties ignore the
third-party effects of their bargain.
Question
Before you move on, if you favor employ-
ment at-will, then don't you have to disfavor
covenants not to compete? Or, if you've got
employees with covenants not to compete,
should they be treated as subject to a more just-
cause kind of standard? In other words, if the
employer is free to fire the other while the
employee is not free to seek employment else-
where.
Professor Schwab
Those are the most interesting cases that
I've included in my employment law case
book. When the employee is fired and then the
employer wants to enforce the covenant not to
compete, it gives the court some pause; howev-
er, there are examples of this taking place.
Something does seem wrong about it. Now,
wrong on what level? If the contract very
explicitly calls for this, maybe you enforce it.
I'd be very reluctant to assume that there are all
implicit understandings, and I'd be even more
reluctant to enforce it. Of course, do not com-




I'm not talking about entirely legalistic
points of view, but strictly from an economic
point of view. Would it seem that there should
be some special consideration for the covenant
contracts?
Professor Ayres
It suggests that there is an intermediate
legal outcome where parties might want to con-
tract to the likes of, "Employer, you can dis-
charge for good, bad, or no reason, but we'll
only enforce covenant not to complete if the
discharge was for good reason." Ifyou have no
good reason to discharge, then the covenant
won't be enforced. There's a question of actu-
ally interpreting whatever contract they chose,
but as an economic matter, I can imagine some
employer/employee relationships where they
wouldn't want just-cause becau~e that would
subject the employer to too much employee
opportunism. But they would want an interme-
diate condition which would say, "Employer,
you can discharge for any reason, but we'll
only let you enforce the covenant if the employ-
ee quits or if you discharge them for good rea-
son."
When judges confront these issues after the
fact, there are usually important interpretative
questions of what the parties actually agreed.
The economic analysis we are doing is aimed at
assessing what the parties might have implicit-
ly contracted for. And I think your questions
lead to the possibility of the intermediate stan-
dard.
Professor Schwab
Let me go through the life-cycle argument
because I want to know whether this rings true
with you. The point being, repeating Epstein,
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that two opportunism problems exist in career
employment. One is on the employer side:
employers can be opportunistic once their
employees are locked in, which just-cause best
protects. When workers have worked hard for
a number of years in return for the implicit
promise that they will be rewarded later, just-
cause protects that promise better than at-will.
On the other hand, at-will best protects employ-
ers from employee shirking. So, what to do?
Well, the answer comes from recognizing that
these dangers vary over the life-cycle or career
pattern of a career worker. Employer oppor-
tunism is greatest at the beginning and espe-
cially at the end of a career, when the worker
has invested a lot and relatively speaking, the
employer has reaped the rewards. The moving
cases that give some courts trouble are exam-
ples of beginning career opportunism, and end
of career is the other one.
During mid-career when employees are
productive, employee opportunism is the
greater threat. If forced to define "mid-career,"
I mean that point in the relationship when a
worker's current productivity exceeds her cur-
rent wages, so that the employer is definitely
making money on this worker. With a goal of
minimizing the overall opportunism on both
sides, courts will strictly enforce at-will con-
tracts during the mid-career, but they scrutinize
firings relatively more at the beginning and par-
ticularly at the end of the career. Now, again, it
is important to emphasize that this is only a
default rule. In other words, the clear intent of
the parties to have an at-will relationship
throughout will trump this life-cycle analysis,
just as if an agreement to the effect of"we have
a just-cause contract from beginning to end of
the career" would trump the life-cycle pre-
sumption. The life-cycle default would apply
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when the parties' intentions are less clear. In
that situation, the life-cycle guidance for the
court is this: if an employee is mid-career, be
less suspicious of the firing. Employers aren't
in the general business of firing productive
workers. Recognize, of course, that mistakes
can happen, but there is more to be said for at-
will at this stage as compared to later.
In summary, my positive analysis (trying
to be careful to Henry's admonition to separate
positive from normative analysis), is that courts
tend to enforce this life cycle model by scruti-
nizing the late-career firings more than mid-
career, absent contractual language giving
courts a clue what to do. My normative claim
is that this is good and efficient.
Allow me to move on to the important sub-
ject of default versus mandatory rules.
Professor Ayres
Before you do so, did you say that the need
to hire new workers is an additional constraint
on employer opportunism? This would suggest
that in declining industries we should have
more severe scrutiny, or that there is more
severe scrutiny.
Professor Schwab
The positive claim is that courts will be
stricter here. I am, however, unaware of any
cases in which courts give declining industry as
a reason for scrutinizing the termination. The
normative claim is that there should be stricter
scrutiny in declining industries. Reputation is
less of a check when a particular employer is
unlikely to be hiring new workers. The
employer does not care what the job recruits
think about it because it is in a declining indus-
try, as opposed to a hiring industry. I think that
is a good point.
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Question
In applying the life-cycle model, do you
mean that judges apply this standard on their
own? I would say that we (Le., judges) do it
because there is specific legislation aimed at
those people that are doing their job later on in
life because they are older. It's just something
we do because of statute.
Professor Schwab
Well, certainly the age discrimination
statutes reinforce this model. Age discrimina-
tion statutes on their face just instruct us to
worry about whether the worker is 55. It is
essentially irrelevant whether they have been at
the firm for 30 years or two years. It's quite
critical for my argument that there be long job
tenure rather than old age. But, I'm mainly
talking about common-law courts. And the
argument that judges are activists in the com-
mon law is not one that I have much sympathy
for. I don't know exactly what it means to be
an activist in the common law. The common
law evolves. Individual judges emphasize in a
particular case what the best facts are to support
the desired judgment. Later judges (probably
appellate judges), helped or spurred by law pro-
fessors, then create rules that synthesize these
various judgments. My argument is that courts
will be more sympathetic on particular matters
when you are late in the life-cycle. And, they
should be.
Professor Henry Butler
Stewart, I have a question relating to the
explanations for the above - that is, m_arket
salaries that some workers may be earning later
in their career. You can distinguish part of it, I
think, between the type of investment that has
Employment Contract
been made early on in the career. For example,
let's say someone stays with the same company
for a long period of time and they're at the last
stage of the game where it appears that there
has been an opportunistic termination. One
thing you could say is that early in their career,
they excepted a below market wage while they
were getting general market training that could
be used with some other employer. That was an
inyestment in them and they have stayed with
this employer; out of seniority, they have ended
up getting an above-market wage for their pro-
ductivity under that rationale.
Another situation would be where they
stayed with this employer and did a very firm-
specific apprenticeship, yet did not receive a
higher wage. That is, most of the models pre-
dict that if you are making an investment, but
it's not something you can capture somewhere
else in the market, the employer will go ahead
and pay you a market wage at that time.
Suppose that for some reason this employee,
out of faith in the employer, goes ahead and
makes this firm-specific investment, and that's
the reason they are getting this above-market
wage later on. That was the implicit contract.
You make the investment in us and then we're
going to pay you off later on. Do those situa-
tions seems different to you?
Professor Schwab
Those situations do seem different. In the
appendix I handed out, there are two different
graphs. The first one is actually a firm-specific
model where at all points the worker is being
paid less than his productivity. Actually, that's
not at all times, but all times late in the life
cycle, in the payback period rather than the
training period. In this case, there's no incen-
tive to get rid of the workers. The second graph
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depicts what economists call the efficiency-
wage model. In that model, late in the life cycle
the worker is being paid more than he or she is
currently producing. To make such relation-
ships work, the parties must rely either on the
employer's desire for a fair reputation, or tum
to the court. So, the way this can be done is to
say, "I'm going to hire you long term; work real
hard and you'll be rewarded for it." You work
hard, work hard, work hard. I then fire you.
Recognizing this danger at the outset, the work-
er might say, "I'm skeptical of that. I'm not
going to enter this contract even though it is
good for both of us." The employer can
counter: "To back up my reputation, I'll agree
that a court can scrutinize me later on. I'm so
confident in my willingness to be fair that I'll
agree to let the courts scrutinize my actions."
This leads directly to my next point. We
don't have any ofthis in writing; we don't real-
ly have any of this orally. It's just an implicit
understanding. What are courts to do in that
situation? Courts recognize that this life-cycle
approach is just a default term, and that they
would defer to any clear statement of the par-
ties.
Question
What do you mean by a "default" term?
Professor Schwab
What I is mean is this: if the parties do not
clearly indicate what legal rule they want to
govern their relationship, we assume that they
wanted a life-cycle default. This is my unique
little theory. Others might assume they wanted
just-cause, or they wanted at-will. But whatev-
er the default term is, the parties can write a
contract that alters the judicial presumption.
That's what I mean by default term.
84
Profesor Ayres
Let me add to the discussion of default
rules. Another term would be a "back-stop"
rule. The modem term "default" comes from
computers. When you tum on your computer
the word processing system has a default left-
hand margin of one inch. But if you don't like
the default margin you can change it. So, in
contract theory, people think about whether the
default term in employment contracts should be
at-will. If at-will is the default, contractors are
free to contract around this default by providing
expressly for just-cause protection, but an at-
will default rule means that in the absence of a
contrary term, at-will treatment will apply.
For example, what is the default price if
somebody leaves a price out of a contract?
Common law says it's the reasonable price.
What's the default quantity if somebody leaves
out the quantity in a contract? This happens
very rarely, but the default quantity is not rea-
sonable, default quantity is zero. If you leave
quantity out ofyour contract, the contract is not
enforceable. So those are the gap-fillers. We
refer to them as defaults.
Professor Schwab
And, of course, much of the day-to-day
activities ofjudges is how to fill in gaps in con-
tracts. The judges fill in the gaps with default
terms.
Professor Ayres
There are basically three deep arguments
about contracts here. One is whether a particu-
lar issue should be contractible or non-con-
tractible. For example, should parties be able to
have an arbitration clause that allows them to
contract away their court rights in Title VII
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cases, or should we say it's not contractible?
It's not merely a default rule if employees have
an absolute right to try their Title VII claims in
court. If employees can't contract away their
right to Title VII actions, then non-arbitration is
more than a default rule-it is a mandatory
rule. You can't contract it away. Statutes do
not solely create mandatory rules. The com-
mon law sometimes creates mandatory rules; as
we are about to see, tort laws are mostly
mandatory. Common law judges make manda-
tory rules when they rule that there's a duty of
good faith performance in all contracts. If a
party enters a contract saying, "Seller waives
duty of good faith performance," nobody's
going to enforce that clause. As a result, some-
times you worry about whether a rule should be
mandatory and non-contractible, or merely
default.
The second deep issue of contracts is if it's
going to be a default, what is the best default
term? Is it better to have an "at-will" or "just-
cause" default? The third issue is this: what
does it take to contract around the default rule?
For example, is a statement in the employment
handbook sufficient? What kind of words are
enough to displace employment at-will?
So the three issues in contract are: (1) is
this particular rule contractible at all? (2) what's
the appropriate default? and (3) how can the
parties contract around it? Libertarians mainly
argue about the first issue. No mandatory rules.
Everything should be contractable. But liber-
tarianism doesn't tell us whether the default
should be just-cause (where people can opt out
of it to employment at-will), or whether the
default should be employment at-will (where
people can contract into just-cause). It also
doesn't tell us much about what should be suf-
ficient to contract around either an opt-out or
Employment Contract
opt-in default. That's what we are about to give
you some economic thoughts about.
Question
To clarify, you are suggesting that the
default rules apply only if the parties have not
addressed the issue? So, the question is, do we
default at-will or just-cause if the parties have
not addressed the ground upon which the rela-
tionship may sever? But now you are saying
that another issue is how many words are nec-
essary to contract around a default. If the par-
ties have words, doesn't that eliminate the
default? If they have addressed it in some fash-
ion, how do we get to the default?
Professor Schwab
The key problem is your qualification of
"in some fashion."
Professor Ayres
Common law or statutory law sometimes
makes certain defaults very sticky. Sometimes
parties can only get around a default by using
magic words. Under the UCC, if you want to
disclaim certain implied warranties, you can
address it with all kinds of fancy words but if
you don't use the magic words of "mer-
chantability," you don't effectively disclaim the
implicit (or default) warranty. Also, in corpo-
rate law, sometimes the statutes say this will be
the default unless you clearly indicate other-
wise. In employment law, some jurisdictions
are very clear when they say, "I don't care how
many representations were made in all these
employment handbooks," "addressing it in
those places will have no effect," or "the parties
must use certain words to have that effect."
Professor Schwab
85
HeinOnline -- 8 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 86 1998-1999
Ayres/Schwab
Let me discuss the approaches to choosing
the appropriate default rule. "Mimicking the
market" is probably the most common
approach. Choose as the default rule what most
parties would adopt if they focused on the
issue. The basic argument is that this approach
saves transaction costs. Most parties are not
going to have to negotiate or decide because
you have provided them with the default, which
is what they probably want. Unfortunately,
that's not the only possible standard for creat-
ing a default rule.
Another standard is that courts should
choose as the default the more difficult rule for
the parties to write down themselves. Why is
this? This is efficient when transaction costs
differ between the rules. For example, perhaps
it's relatively easy ifyou don't like default A, to
write down term B. But if term B is a default,
it may be hard to go to term A. Under this
approach, courts don't necessarily care what
most people do. Even if most people want
another rule, they can easily opt out whereas
people would otherwise have a hard time get-
ting to this rule.
Professor Ayres
Let me apply that right away to Schwab's
model. I think it's easy for people to contract
for employment at-will. You can do that in
about ten seconds with very clear language. It
is much harder to contract for the kind of
implicit protections that the Schwab life-cycle
rule. How can you write that down? You don't
want to use the words, "When you're in mid-
career you won't get as much protection as
when you are old or young." There are many
more nuances involved.
By the way, I might emphasize that
Schwab has looked at tons of cases. The argu-
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ment isn't that nobody has ever written a life-
cycle default into the contract; rather, case-law
suggests that it's much more likely that plain-
tiffs are going to win when they've been there
many years (or just a few), and that they are less
likely to win in the intermediate years.
Schwab's descriptive claim is that we have this
kind of vague, fuzzy default, and maybe that's
a good thing because of this second reason: it's
hard to write it down, but easy to write down
the opposite if particular parties don't want that
type of relationship.
Professor Schwab
The third approach to default rules, which
I don't think we'll spend too much time on, is
actually the one made famous by Ian. This is
what is called "information forcing" default
rules or penalty defaults. The idea is this: in
some situations we are quite sure that many or
most people don't want this rule, but this rule
gives the parties incentives to reveal that anoth-
er rule would be more appropriate and the rev-
elation of this information is useful. Applied
here-and it is questionable whether it should
be applied here-if workers don't know what
the state of the law is out there, but employers
have a pretty good guess, let's have just-cause
as a penalty default. If employers don't want it,
they have to tell the workers what the rule is.
That will get the information out there.
Professor Ayres
It shows we've spent a lot more time on
Schwab's theory here. The penalty-default
approach will be relevant too when we fmally
get to our survey about people's knowledge of
the law. If some people don't know what the
law is, the idea here is you might want to penal-
ize the side that knows what the law is. Not
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penalize them ultimately, this is still freedom of
contract. But just say, "Look, unless you tell
your employees that they can be frred for good,
bad, or no reason, then we're going to hold you
to just-cause firing."
To go back to your earlier question, if you
take this penalty default theory seriously, you
really want to make sure that the words that
were used to contract around a penalty default
were ones that were clear enough that the
employee sees it. You might want to have pro-
cedures which the common law sometimes
requires like a franchise agreement. For exam-
ple, perhaps employees must initial the at-will
clause. Or perhaps the contract must explain the
at-will relationship sufficiently so that it actual-
ly informs employees, so that they say, "Yikes!
This is an employer that really is going to have
power over me."
Professor Schwab
Let me move on to the mandatory employ-
ment rules. These are defined to be parts of the
contract that the employees cannot waive the
protections of or the parties cannot write
around. There are lots of examples. Wage and
hours laws are typically mandatory rules.
Workers' compensation is typically this way;
employment discrimination is typically this
way. We've been discussing the very intricate
rule of arbitration of employment discrimina-
tion complaints-should it be this way? In the
common-law, what is the general line between
default and mandatory rules? It's typically
between contract or contract-like issues and tort
rules. In contract, at the end of the day courts
usually try to enforce what the parties want, and
the parties can enforce anything they want. In
tort, at the end of the day courts say, "We don't




But even within contract law there is a
respectable theory of mandatory rules. You
can't waive the duty of good faith; you can't
waive unconscionability; you can't contract for
an unreasonably long covenant not to compete.
In many jurisdictions there are things you just
can't contract away. It's not just activist judges,
but good common-law practice asks whether
particular terms are waiveable.
Professor Schwab
It is definitely a simplification to say that
all contract issues are default issues only. But
just to remind us again, what's the rationale as
to the mandatory rules? The law is very confi-
dent that at least one of the parties is not acting
in their own interests. This harkens back to the
paternalism argument. Or we have market fail-
ur~. Let me apply this to the tort of wrongful
discharge against public policy, which is some-
thing that you judges confront frequently. This
is a mandatory rule because employees cannot
waive this protection in advance. If they later
want to bring this wrongful discharge claim,
they can.
Professor Ayres
At least in some jurisdictions.
Professor Schwab
The tort is not recognized in every juris-
diction, that's right. Indeed, my home state of
New York does not have general wrongful dis-
charge tort. But when it is recognized, as far as
I know, it invariably has this form of being
mandatory.
The best rationale for this tort is that a mar-
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ket failure exists. It's the classic market failure
of external or third-party effects. The contract-
ing parties, the employer and employee, are not
considering all the costs in their transaction
when they agree to an at-will contract. For
example, a classic situation arises in cases like
Nees v. Hocks. s An employee was fired for
refusing jury duty. The employer and employ-
ee did not consider the effects of the judicial
system when they agreed to an at-will contract.
Because ofthese third-party effects, we will not
enforce the at-will contract. The Nees v. Hocks
case was creating new law in 1975, and they
had a little trouble naming the tort. They reject-
ed the label prima facie tort, however. Today,
this is a classic example of the tort of wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy.
Another classic case of third-party effects
involves whistle blowing. Whistle blowing is a
tricky category as you undoubtedly know. But
the third-party effects are sometimes clear.
Suppose an employee is fired after informing
authorities that the company was dumping
toxic waste into the river. The third-party dam-
ages from chilling such whistleblowing are
clear.
Some cases are difficult to justify on third-
party effects grounds. The biggest example
involves employee privacy claims, which I
think a lot of courts wrestle with. It's very hard
except in really outrageous cases to have suc-
cessful employee privacy claims. There's good
reason why these cases are so hard: the third-
party effects are hard to see. And so, my argu-
ment is that courts mostly enforce privacy
claims only on contract grounds. There's a
well-known case of Rulon-Miller v. IBM,6 cited
by Walter Olsen, where an employee recovered
damages when she was fired for dating an
88
employee of a competitor. I view that as large-
ly contract-based. IBM got in trouble in that
case by promising to be fair and then reneging
on their promise.
Question
What is an employee privacy claim?
Professor Schwab
An at-work example occurs when employ-
ees complain that supervisors invaded their pri-
vacy by searching their lockers, such as the K-
Mart v. Trotti case from Texas.7 Other exam-
ples involve eavesdropping on phone calls.
Many computer e-mail cases lead to invasion-
of-privacy claims. Legislatures have stepped in
here in an important way. Common-law courts,
however, are constrained in aggressively polic-
ing of employee privacy claims, precisely
because the third-party effects are hard to see.
Why should courts intervene in a contractual
relationship where the parties clearly agreed to
an at-will relationship and no third parties are
being harmed when the employer searches for
drugs? Employees occasionally' succeed on
common-law privacy claims, but they really
involve extreme facts.
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